This paper analyses the impact of the new
Introduction
The Basel III liquidity standards constitute a cornerstone of the international regulatory reaction to the on-going economic and financial crisis. While capital regulation at the international level dates back to the 1980s, liquidity regulation remained fragmented across borders. Thus, the international regulatory and central banking community has less expertise concerning the potential negative side-effects of international liquidity standards, e.g. on money markets and monetary policy implementation. In addition, the mandate of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and its sub-group Working Group on Liquidity (WGL) focused on financial stability. The potential impacts 1 Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna. stefan.schmitz@oenb.at. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the OeNB. of the standards on monetary policy were not taken into consideration until the standards were agreed. In a number of presentations since 2009 I pointed out that the standards could have a negative impact on monetary policy implementation in the Euro area (e.g. Schmitz 2009 Schmitz , 2010 . Since mid-2010 the topic also enjoys more attention from central banks. While I agree with most of the conclusions of the respective papers, I argue that they tend to focus on the static, technical impacts. In this paper I point out that the impact is exacerbated by the negative network dynamics set free by the Basel III liquidity standards and by the impact of the on-going crisis per se.
Despite the potential negative side-effects of the standards on monetary policy implementation, there is broad agreement that the Basel III liquidity standards constitute an important improvement of financial regulation. While they have some conceptual shortcomings, they are broadly in line with a functional approach to liquidity regulation 2 .
The burden of adjustment, thus, rests on monetary policy implementation in the various currency
areas rather than on fundamental changes to the standards themselves.
The note is structured along the following lines: In section 2 I review a number of ECB papers on the potential impact of the standards on monetary policy implementation. In section 3 I develop a conceptual framework to investigate the interaction between the money market and monetary policy implementation. In section 4 I study the negative network dynamics and feedback loops that exacerbate the impact of the standards; in section 5, I integrate the impact of the on-going crisis itself on monetary policy implementation in the Euro area. In Section 6 I discuss potential policy reactions. In the appendix I summarise the definition of the LCR and the NSFR. In addition, I provide a short overview over the QIS results to indicate the size of the liquidity gap of banks under the LCR and NSFR.
Opinions concerning the impact of the Basel III liquidity standards on the implementation of monetary policy

Summary of the relevant literature
First, the available literature is scarce. A recent ECB study (ECB 2010a) criticised the definition of liquid assets under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) as being too narrow and suggested that non-financial corporate bonds and covered bonds should be included, at least. They have since been included with minimum ratings of AA-as Level 2 liquid assets with 15 per cent haircuts and a limit of 60 per cent of liquid assets (BCBS 2010b). Schmitz (2009 Schmitz ( , 2010 and Bindseil/Lamoot (2011) 
argued that the narrow definition provided incentives to submit eligible assets which are not included in the definition of liquid assets at the national central banks (NCBs) in long-term refinancing operations (LTROs).
The market depth and breadth of these markets would further deteriorate and the Eurosystem would have to bear the additional market liquidity risk. While the incentive was reduced by the inclusion of covered bonds and non-financial corporate bonds, it still pertains to assets that are central bank eligible, but not eligible under the LCR. This is particularly relevant for (uncovered) bank bonds, asset backed securities (ABS), and of course credit claims.
Third, they suppose that banks would face strong disincentives to lend and/or borrow on the unsecured money market. The breadth and depth on these markets would further shrink and the market would lose its allocation and distribution function for liquidity in the Euro area. The reduction of volumes and tenors in money markets would be stronger than desired and might have negative repercussions on the liquidity risk management, the liquidity risk exposure, and the liquidity risk absorption capacity of banks. Banks would further lose confidence in the unsecured money market and in segments of the secured money market. The system of pooling collateral would be under pressure. Banks would prefer an "ear marking" system which would allow them to single out the assets that are available to cover the LCR. That would also enable banks to further arbitrage between the definition of liquid assets and the Single List. While I agree with these conclusions, I would argue that they tend to underestimate the overall impact of the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy implementations for two reasons: first, they do not take into account the second-round and feedback-effects the new standards have on the money market and on banks; secondly, they do not take into account the potential repercussions for the structural liquidity deficit; finally, they disregard the impact of the crisis itself on the implementation of monetary policy. , not all bids will be satisfied and the allotment of additional funds and the marginal allotment rate will depend on the allotment mechanism in place.
The conceptual framework -the money market and monetary policy implementation in the Euro area
The overnight rate remains close to the target level also between OMOs, as central banks determine the maximum operational volume of OMOs precisely with the intention to cover the estimated structural liquidity deficit in the money market at the announced level of the operating target. The implementation process is designed in a way to ensure that aggregate supply and aggregate demand intersect at the announced level of the operating target, unless central banks' estimates of the structural deficit are wrong and/or conditions in the money market change unexpectedly. In equilibrium, commercial banks bidding for overnight reserves have no incentive to pay overnight rates substantially above the target level, as they arrange their bidding behaviour at OMOs accordingly. In addition, the effects of temporary liquidity shocks on aggregate demand for overnight reserves are (partly) absorbed by averaging arrangements for reserve requirements over the fulfilment period. The longer the remaining fulfilment period, the 11 If the participating banks anticipate that demand will be below ∆R Smax , the respective bid rates will be r OMOmin .
more of a temporary shock can be absorbed by intertemporal substitution. 12 Given that the frequency of OMOs is relatively high with respect to the fulfilment period market participants can to some extent intertemporally substitute bidding at OMOs for overnight credit.
[Diagram 3]
After refinancing operations are concluded, the supply of aggregate reserves is determined and beyond the discretion of the participants of the interbank market and the payment system. They are active on the intraday and the overnight money market and supply and demand on both markets are interdependent. In order to address larger liquidity shocks or those occurring towards the end of the fulfilment period, central banks have additional instruments at their discretion that enable them to stabilise the operating target in the period between OMOs: intraday credit and standing facilities. . Intraday credit also increases the stability of the interbank payment system vis-à-vis net settlement systems by making payment obligations more visible and enhancing risk management. Hence, the supply of aggregate intraday liquidity is endogenised to some extent. In addition, intraday credit reduces the liquidity costs in RTGS. It is usually collateralised to decrease the credit risk of central banks and has to be retired at the end of the day, in order to prevent spill over into the overnight market, where it would exert downward pressure on the main operating target.
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[Diagram 4]
As intraday credit has to be repaid at the end of the trading day, the aggregate supply of overnight reserves is independent of intraday liquidity management by central banks. The demand for overnight central bank balances is determined by a number of related factors:
predominantly by minimum reserve requirements, end-of-day balance of banks' settlement accounts (banks usually targeted zero O/N excess reserves), autonomous 14 Borio 2001. 15 Leinonen (2009) . 16 In the Euro area, intraday credit (daylight overdraft) that is not repaid at the end of the day is treated as credit from the lending facility.
factors, the remaining duration of the fulfilment period, and the expectations concerning future overnight interest rates until the end of the fulfilment period.
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Given the remaining duration of the fulfilment period, banks' expectations concerning the future overnight interest rates until the end of the maintenance period, and their expectations concerning the overnight interest rate at the end of the day, banks formulate their targets for their overnight reserves. Given this target banks try to utilise their (limited) room for manoeuvre during the day to reach end-of-day balances equal to their targets (mainly MRRs). After realisation of end-of-day balances banks lend excess reserves or borrow to cover deficiencies in the overnight market. Their lending and borrowing decisions are not mechanically determined by end-of-day balances relative to the overnight reserve target, but also reflect deviations of the overnight rate from expectations. Given banks' expectations concerning future overnight rates, increases in current overnight rates provide an incentive for banks to decrease their overnight reserve target and to increase lending or decrease borrowing in the market. The elasticity of supply and demand with respect to overnight rates depends on banks' risk preferences.
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Due to the decreasing marginal liquidity service yield of central bank overnight reserves, their aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the overnight rate. Their aggregate supply is determined exogenously.
Changes in expectations of future overnight rates over the maintenance period shift the demand and supply curves in the current overnight money market. Increases in expected future rates shift the current demand schedule upwards as current reserves can be substituted for future reserves over the averaging period. Correspondingly, decreasing expected future rates shift the demand schedule downwards.
In addition to OMOs and intraday credit central banks usually grant access to (some sort of) standing facilities to park (deposit facility) or to raise liquidity (lending facility) at a premium relative to the minimum bid rate. The rates charged on these (r DF and r LF in 17 For a survey of the literature on models of banks' reserve management see Ewerhart/Cassola/Ejerskov/Valla (2003) .
18 Ho/Saunders (1985 Standing facilities are not employed to steer market liquidity at large, but to reduce the volatility of the overnight rate in cases of temporary liquidity shocks exceeding the absorptive capacity of minimum reserve requirements. 
The LCR reduces the volume of and the participation in the short-term money market (≤ 30 days)
All components of the LCR (cash-inflows, cash-outflows, and the value of the counterbalancing capacity) are non-deterministic. Assume a bank experiences an For the lender the very same interbank loans are attractive, as they would reduce its liquid assets, but 1:1 also its net cash-outflow over 30 days -the loan is fully recognised as inflow. Thus, the LCR has little impact on the marginal costs of such an interbank loan for the lender.
The picture is inverted for interbank loans with a maturity exceeding 30 days. Initially, the LCR increases the relative benefit at the margin of such a loan for the borrower, as it does not increase net cash-outflows but can improve the borrower's LCR, if it increases the cash-position or is invested in a liquid asset; otherwise, it is neutral. (Once the residual maturity drops to 30 days, the loan has to be fully backed by liquid assets and its marginal costs again increase for the borrower vis-à-vis a world without LCR, ceteris 20 Although it will reduce the percentage shortfall: given a bank with net cash-outflows of 10 billion currency units and LCR by replacing the run-off liability with a similar liability). The difference now is that the binding constraint, the LCR, is immediately binding at the margin. The primary effect is that, both, the volume and the participation in the short-term interbank market decreases. 21 While this is in line with the objectives of the LCR, it also has unintended consequences.
Network dynamics and negative feedback loops reinforce the impact of the LCR
The LCR will reduce volumes in the unsecured interbank market. But it will also unleash negative dynamics that exacerbate the initial impact. The interbank market can be interpreted as a network of participating banks. Positive network externalities and dynamics apply: the more banks participate and the higher market volume, the easier it is to obtain funding, the lower the risk of market dislocations due to idiosyncratic risk at one market participant. However, once the LCR sets in motion a reduction of volumes and participation, this could lead to a negative feedback loop based on a shrinking and disintegration network with decreasing volume: the LCR increases incentives for banks to self-insure against liquidity shocks and to hold excess reserves, due to the reduction of the insurance function of the unsecured interbank market with respect to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
Two forces are at work here: due to the reduction of the insurance function of the unsecured interbank market, banks hold higher liquidity reserves and due to the arbitrage opportunities provided the deviation between the single list and the LCR definition of liquid assets, banks face incentives to hold this liquidity cushion in the form of central bank money (excess reserves). With fewer banks participating in the market and volumes being lower, idiosyncratic shocks have a stronger impact on the market -both, on volumes and rates. Thus, the market becomes more prone to liquidity shocks, which further reduces its (perceived) "insurance value" exactly when this is needed. This in turn further incentivises banks to self-insure against liquidity shocks, which again reduces participation and volume. Classical network dynamics emerge, which reinforce the initial impact of the LCR. These dynamics had already been set in motion by the crisis itself:
Banks had regarded the unsecured money market as a reliable source of funding (until August 2007) and, thus, the market fulfilled a perceived insurance function. But the crisis itself highlighted that banks' perception of reliable excess to unsecured short-term funding was misguided and banks started to hoard liquidity (self-insured against liquidity shocks); these dynamics will be reinforced by the negative feedback-loop emanating from the LCR. A return to the pre-crisis perception is not a policy objective. To the contrary, the LCR aims at preventing banks' to return to that false sense of security regarding the reliability of unsecured short-term funding.
The relevance and information content of EONIA decreases, its volatility increases
The reduced volume on the short-term money market reduces the role played by EONIA in the monetary transmission mechanism.
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EONIA does no longer provide a reliable indication of the liquidity stance of the Euro area banking system. In addition, the decreased volume and participation is exacerbated by the negative network dynamics which hampers the price discovery mechanism of the O/N money market. 23 The volatility of EONIA and other 22 See also Holthausen/Bindseil (2011) .
23 Would higher levels of excess reserves reduce the volatility of EONIA? No. Fewer banks might be directly affected by dislocations in the money market due to their self-insurance capacity. But since price-discovery operates at the margin, those banks that actually try to tap the market are likely to face higher volatility.
unsecured short-term rates increases. This is in line with the findings of ECB (2011). The
LCR and negative network dynamics increase the size and volatility of the structural liquidity deficit
Since banks cannot cover shocks to their liquidity position by tapping the short-term money market, they have to hold higher transaction and precautionary balances. Before
August 2007 banks held very little excess reserves (i.e. in excess over the MMR). The structural liquidity deficit could easily be estimated by the Eurosystem, as its main driver -the MMR -was backward looking. Under the LCR the excess reserves will increase substantially and they will be influenced by banks' perceptions of uncertainty with respect to future cash-flows which drive the demand for transaction and precautionary balances.
Both change continuously with the reassessment of the probability of net cash-outflows and changes of banks' uncertainty aversion. As these factors are unobservable contemporaneously the estimation of the structural liquidity becomes much harder.
Substantial excess reserves point to a more fundamental challenge: minimum reserve requirements were introduced precisely with the intention to stabilise the demand for the central bank money. If they do not constitute a binding constraint anymore, they cannot fulfil this function.
One important caveat to this scenario remains: the above deliberations assume that banks adjust their liquid assets to changes in their net cash outflows under the LCR. However, it is also possible that they adjust their net cash outflows. In particular, they might do so via their exposure to the unsecured short-term money market, although I regard this as unlikely, given the high opportunity costs (excess reserves yield no interest). This demand might, in theory, be sufficient to maintain a sufficiently high and stable volume and a sufficiently stable network structure to forestall the negative network dynamics highlighted above. 
Bidding behaviour will be more aggressive and more volatile
Banks face incentives to participate in Eurosystem open market operations and to post non-LCR-eligible assets
The 
Summary of section 5
The main challenge for monetary policy implementation stems from the negative network dynamics and feedback loops unleashed by the LCR which increase the size and the volatility of the structural liquidity deficit. Furthermore, more aggressive bidding would lead to a decrease of the interest rate sensitivity of the new demand schedule under a situation of heightened uncertainty on the money market, i.e. when some banks face idiosyncratic shocks and/or want to increase their self-insurance capacity against idiosyncratic shocks and shocks to the money market.
Not only is the intercept of the demand schedule prone to uncertainty but also its slope. In section 5, I leave it deliberately ambiguous to which money market rate r po1 refers.
Currently, the framework of monetary policy implementation targets the unsecured O/N rate EONIA. But the relationship between EONIA and monetary policy implementation presupposes an arbitrage relationship between the unsecured money market and central bank policy tools (i.e. open market operations, standing facilities, quick tenders). However, all policy tools are collateralised. In the following section I will investigate the impact of the on-going crisis on this arbitrage relationship and suggest that also the target interest rate will have to change.
The impact of the current crisis on the implementation of monetary policy in the Eurosystem
The ( tenors increased even further from 14 to 65 basis points but its volatility actually 25 In addition to the increasing volatility of market rates and indices, there is more than enough anecdotal evidence that the dispersion of individual bid rates increased sharply; even to the extent that many banks were shut-out of the market, regardless of their bid-rates. Individual bid-rates of panel banks were published for the first time in September 2008, so that there is no pre-crisis data available for our analysis.
decreased from 319 to 268 basis points. This was a result of the very stable expectations of an extended period of low short-term interest rates.
[Diagram 8]
It is interesting that the impact of the crisis on the spread between EONIA and T/N Eurepo is much less than that on the longer tenors. To some extent this is a consequence of the liquidity policy of the ECB (occasional quick tenders between August 2007 and October 2008 and fixed rate tenders with full allotment thereafter). In addition, I
interpret this as further evidence that liquidity risk and not just market risk plays a fundamental role in explaining the dislocations on the money markets. 26 Given that the impact of the Basel III liquidity standards is highest for unsecured money markets, I
would expect the volatility differential between the unsecured and the secured segments of the money market to increase, ceteris paribus. With demand and supply for excess reserves being driven to a larger extent by transactions and precautionary demand, I
would also expect the volume of unsecured interbank transactions to be more volatile.
This follows from the fact that the latter is a residual position of the former, at a given liquidity positions of the banks in the market. Thus, the introduction of the LCR is unlikely to reduce the volatility differential between the unsecured and the secured segment (rather to the contrary) 27 . The transmission of monetary policy along the unsecured yield curve is prone to shocks and higher volatility.
To sum up, independently of the Basel liquidity standards, EONIA is unlikely to remain a good target rate for monetary policy implementation in the future. This is a consequence of the larger and more volatile spread between the unsecured and the secured money market rates which disturbs the (perceived) arbitrage relationship between the unsecured money market and open market operations.
Potential policy reactions
In sections 5 and 6 I argue that, both, the framework and the target interest rate of monetary policy implementation will have to adapt as a consequence of the introduction of the LCR and the legacy of the crisis on money markets in the foreseeable future. In this section I review the potential policy reactions suggested in Bindseil/Lamoot (2011) to address the technical effects of the LCR on monetary policy implementation.
Potential policy reactions discussed in the Eurosystem
In order to address the potential shift of banks' demand from MROs to LTROs, Bindseil/Lamoot (2011) presents three potential policy actions:
1. Introduction of a 0% run-off factor for all central bank refinancing operations: In principle, this solution eliminates the incentive to shift from MROs to LTROs.
For the current set of banks that participate in OMOs and for the demand for The note suggests assessing the costs and benefits of such a move carefully, which is certainly a good idea. Especially, the questions needs to be addressed which secured rate should be targeted; will the LCR impact Eurepo? Currently, there is one secured rate for repos and it is independent of the underlying collateral. Differences in the quality of collateral are addressed via different haircuts. This might change in the future, since the opportunity costs in terms of liquid assets to be held against different repos (in level 1, 2 assets and non-LCR-eligible assets) differ substantially.
Potential policy reactions derived from sections 5 and 6
The main conclusions from sections 5 and 6 are in line with the conclusions of (Bindseil/Würtz 2006, 52) . Market participants expect the market rate to correspond to the weighted average of the rates of the standing facilities; the weights of the deposit facility is the probability that the system has an aggregate excess supply of liquidity at the end of the day, while the weight of the rate on the lending facility is the probability that the system faces an aggregate shortage of liquidity at the end of the day. How smooth these probabilities and consequently the market rate evolve cannot be predicted. But given that I expect transactions and precautionary demand components to take precedents under the LCR, I would expect market rates to be more volatile and standing facilities, in particular the lending facility, to play more of a role. I would not expect the deviations of the market rate to follow a symmetric distribution, let alone a normal distribution; one the one hand, this could be addressed by an asymmetric channel, one the other, the Eurosystem would simple have to adapt to a new normal of a more active role.
Conclusions
First, monetary policy implementation in the Eurosystem will have to adapt with respect to, both, the target rate and the implementation framework. Second, the burden of adjustment clearly rests on the Eurosystem, because Basel III is applicable in many currency areas with different frameworks for monetary policy implementation and the main challenges are posed by the intended reduction of banks' reliance on short-term (unsecured) funding which is also in the interest of central banks.
The impacts of the LCR on the current framework can be summarised along the following lines:
1. The LCR disincentivises banks to lend and/or borrow on the unsecured money market. 
A1.1. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) aims at increasing the resilience of banks under stress over a 30 day period without special government or central bank support (BCBS 2010) . 31 The LCR is a minimum requirement. As such it pertains to large internationally active banks on a consolidated basis. In the EU it will be implemented in the CRD IV, albeit with some deviations from the Basel standards to take into account EU specifities, in particular the implementation for all banks as well as the application on a solo and consolidated basis. The severe stress scenario combines a market wide and idiosyncratic stress including a three notch rating downgrade, the run-off of retail and wholesale deposits, the drying up of primary and secondary markets (repo, securitisation) for many assets and large cash-outflows due to offbalance sheet items.
The LCR is defined as the ratio of liquid assets over the net cash-outflows over the 30 day horizon. Cash, excess central bank reserves (to the extent that these deposits can be withdrawn in times of stress; i.e. Planned inflows from performing retail loans and loans to non-financial corporates are capped at 50 per cent. Full recognition of contractual inflows is granted to reverse repos in non-eligible assets and performing wholesale loans to financial institutions.
A1.2. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
The objective 
